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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of
Appeals in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Section
78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from the final judgment and order
entered by the trial court herein, consisting of an Amended
Decree of Divorce, on or about October 17, 1989. On
December 26, 1989, at the request of Plaintiff's counsel, an
Order Extending the Time for Appeal, extending the time for
appeal to December 26, 1989, was signed and entered by the
judge of the trial court.

On December 26, 1989, Defendant

filed his Notice of Appeal herein with the Third Judicial
District Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review in the abovecaptioned appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the lower court err in granting Plaintiff an

award of attorney's fees in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000.00)?
2.

Did the lower court err in awarding Plaintiff

permanent alimony.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or
rules believed by Appellee to be wholly dispositive of the

issues on appeal herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This case arises out of a divorce proceeding

that was initially heard before the Honorable John A. Rokich
on or about January 5, 1989.

(Appendix A - Decree of

Divorce "DOD M ).
2.

The Decree of Divorce dissolved the marriage but

did not dispose of other issues and these issues were
reserved and heard at trial.
3.

(Appendix A - DOD).

This matter was heard before the Honorable John

A. Rokich on all other issues on or about July 13, 14, and
17, 1989.
4.

Subsequent to the trial on the matter, the Court

entered an Amended Decree of Divorce on or about October 27,
1989.

(Appendix B - Amended Decree of Divorce "ADOD").
5.

The Court also entered amended Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law subsequent to the trial.

(Appendix C

- Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("AFOF").
6.

The parties were married on or about July 27,

1979, and the Decree of Divorce in this matter terminated
the marriage on January 5, 1989, some six (6) months short
of ten (10) years.
7.

(Appendix C - AFOF, paragraph 2 ) .

In determining the issue of alimony, the Court

specifically found that the Plaintiff/Appellee was currently
unemployed and was attending school full time as a student.
(Appendix C - AFOF, paragraph 12).
2

8.

While Appellee was unemployed, the Court did

find that, because of current job skills, Plaintiff/Appellee
was capable of earning $18,000.00 per year, or $1,500.00 per
month, and imputed that income earning capability to the
Plaintiff/Appellee for the purposes of alimony.

(Appendix C

- AFOF, paragraph 13).
9.

The Court also determined that the

Defendant/Appellant was employed as a medical doctor and had
a gross monthly income of $7,560.00.

(Appendix C - AFOF,

paragraph 14).
10.

The Court in this case also issues a Memorandum

Decision as to questions of equitable restitution.
(Appendix D - Memorandum Decision "Memo").
11.

In its Memorandum Decision, the Court found

that the Plaintiff/Appellee did not make sacrifices or
contributions that increased the earning capacity of the
Defendant, but did find that as a mother, the
Plaintiff/Appellee did contribute to the family relationship
(Appendix D - Memo, page 4).
12.

Based upon the findings of the Court, the Court

awarded alimony to Plaintiff/Appellee for an indeterminant
period of time in the sum of $650.00 per month.
13.

The Plaintiff requested payment of attorney's

fees in the sum of $29,000.00.

The Court reviewed the

factors surrounding the attorney's fees, found that the
hourly rate was reasonable, but that the Plaintiff had made
3

substantial demands upon counsel which were not necessary.
Based upon its findings regarding the circumstances of the
attorney's fees, the Court awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees
in the sum of $10,000.00 (Appendix C - AFOF, paragraph 45).
14.

The other issues of property and custody were

resolved by the Court and are not part of this appeal but
are set forth in the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce.
15.

In this matter, the lower court did extend the

time to file an appeal to December 26, 1989.
filed notices of appeal in this matter.

Both parties

However,

Plaintiff's counsel withdrew and Plaintiff was not able to
prosecute her appeal.
16.

Therefore, it was dismissed.

Various extensions of time have been granted by

the Court and all pleadings herein to date have been filed
pursuant to those extensions of time.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In reviewing decisions of the Trial Court in
domestic relations cases, the Appellate Courts give wide
latitude to the discretion of the Trial Court.

An appellant

must show that the findings were clearly erroneous.

The

appellant has the obligation to marshall the record and
present the record to the Appellate Court so the court can
determine if the Trial Court abused its discretion and
entered findings that were clearly erroneous.

In this case,

the Appellant has failed to even indicate which findings he
4

believes are clearly erroneous.

No record of the trial has

been referred to by Appellant and no action taken by the
Court has been challenged on the basis of legal authority.
The Appellant has failed to meet its burden as to the
standard of review.
The Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals has
determined that the Trial Court has discretion to determine
if attorney's fees are appropriate and if so, the amount of
said fees.

This is based upon the needs of the parties and

what award would be reasonable.

In this case, the Court

specifically found that the income of the parties was
substantially desparate and carefully reviewed the
attorney's fees claim by the Plaintiff.

The Court

determined that $19,000.00 of the attorney's fees that were
claimed was not reasonable under the circumstances.

The

Court did not find that the amount of time spent by counsel
or the work performed was unreasonable, but rather the
demands made were not appropriate.

Therefore, the Trial

Court awarded attorney's fees based on need and
reasonableness and met the test required by the Appellate
Courts.
As to alimony, the Appellant appears not to question
the amount of alimony, but rather only questions whether the
Court should have made an award of rehabilitative alimony
rather than the award of alimony for an indetermant time.
In determining the alimony, the Trial Court must look at the

5

ability of the receiving spouse to produce income, the
financial income and need of the receiving spouse and the
ability of the paying spouse to pay alimony.

In looking at

these factors, the Trial Court is to keep in mind that the
purpose of the award of alimony is to try and maintain the
standard of living enjoyed by the parties, prevent the
receiving spouse from becoming a public charge and to try
and equalize the respective standards of living.
regard, the Trial Court performed its function.

In this
It is clear

from the court's finding as to respective incomes, that,
absent an award of alimony, the Plaintiff/Appellee would not
be able to even come close to maintaining a comparable
standard of living.

The Court took into account that

Plaintiff was capable of earning income, but with her
skills, it was also clear that she could not maintain the
standard of living.

The disparity between the parties, even

with Plaintiff's skills, was such that the award of
"permanent" alimony was proper.
The Appellant has failed to set forth any findings
that he claims were erroneous and has failed to set forth
any authority to support the position of the Trial Court
errored.

Even if such authority was presented, the Trial

Court's actions were within its discretion and were
supported by its findings.

Therefore, the lower court's

determination should be upheld and under the circumstances
of Plaintiff's impecuniosity, attorney's fees should be
6

awarded on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN DOMESTIC CASES IS THAT THE
LOWER COURT IS GIVEN WIDE LATITUDE AND DISCRETION
In this case, the Trial Court properly exercised its
discretion.

In prosecuting an appeal, the Appellant has the

duty to marshall all the evidence supporting the Trial
Court's findings and then demonstrate that such evidence is
insufficient to support the court's findings.

See Call v.

City of West Jordan, 129 Utah Adv. Rpt. 38, 40 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) citing Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 682
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

In this case, the Appellant has

failed to designate or set forth anything in the transcript
or on the record to support a finding that the Trial Court
made findings based on insufficient evidence.

The Appellant

goes so far as to request that the Appellate Court set aside
the award of attorney's fees based upon the Trial Court's
exclusion of evidence.

Yet, the Appellant fails to

designate a portion of the transcript to support the
position that the evidence should have been admitted.

Based

on this factor alone, the Appellate Court could rule against
the Appellant.
In a myriad of cases, the courts have indicated that
the Trial Court is the place to adjudicate domestic matters.
This is "because the proper adjudication of matters is
highly dependent upon personal equations which the Trial
7

Court is in an advantaged position to appraise."

Smith v.

Smith, 726 P.2d 423# 425 (Utah 1986) citing Johnson v.
Johnson, 323 P.2d 16, 19 (Utah 1958).

Both the Utah Supreme

Court and the Appellate Court have indicated that they will
not overturn a Trial Court's determination in domestic
matters unless the Appellant can show a misapplication of
the facts by the Trial Court in applying principles of law.
Unless the evidence presented clearly preponderates to the
contrary, the Trial Court's interpretation of the facts must
be allowed by the Appellate Court, Berqer v. Berqer, 713
P.2d 695 (Utah 1985).
Since then, the courts have gone even farther.

In

Erwin v. Erwin, 108 Utah Adv. Rpt. 55 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
the court found that "we are not confined to the contents of
a particular document entitled bindings'; rather the
findings may be expressed orally from the bench or contained
in other documents ..." at 56.

Therefore, the Appellate

Court is free to review all documents in the record,
including the Memorandum Decision, and the initial Findings
and Decree in determining whether the Trial Court abused its
discretion.

In reviewing these documents, the court will

find that the Trial Court made specific findings regarding
alimony and attorney's fees and that the Appellant has shown
nothing in the record to overturn the findings.
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II
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE TESTS
IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND THEREFORE IT WAS
WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE Trial Court
TO AWARD SAID FEES•
This Court has long recognized that it is within the
sound discretion of the Trial Court to assess the evidence
in domestic cases and determine if an award of attorney's
fees is appropriate, Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah
1980), Anderson v. Anderson, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

In determining whether an award of attorney's fees

is appropriate, the Trial Court must find that the award is
reasonable and that the needs of the requesting party
compels the award.

See Oscruthorpe v. Osquthorpe, 131 Utah

Adv. Rpt. 21, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), Sorenson v. Sorenson,
769 P.2d 820, 832 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) and Walther v.
Walther 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985).

In these cases, the court

held that the factors to be used in determining
reasonableness went to the necessity for the number of hours
utilized, the reasonableness of the rate charged, result
accomplished and the rates commonly charged for similar
services, Sorenson.
Here the Court went through a very lengthy
discussion regarding the attorney's fees.

The Court had

already determined that the incomes of the parties were
desparate and that the other factors in determining the
reasonableness of the attorney's fees were present.

The one

thing the Court did do was determine that only a portion of
9

the hours were reasonably necessary.
paragraph 45.

See Appendix C,

Therefore, the Trial Court went through the

analysis required under Utah law in making a determination
of reasonableness and need for the award of attorney's fees.
This determination of reasonableness is further supported by
the factors enunciated by this Court in Rasband v. Rasband,
752 P.2d 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) citing Beales v. Beales,
682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984) and Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694
P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985).

The Trial Court soundly

exercised its discretion and its determination is supported
by the findings in the record.

The Appellant has set forth

no evidence to support a finding that the Trial Court
improperly exercised its discretion in this matter.
The Appellant did introduce the question of the
proposed Pre-trial Settlement Agreement.

The Appellant

claims that a proposed Pre-trial Settlement Agreement was
submitted as evidence to show that the Appellee had "run up"
attorney's fees when she could have settled a year prior to
trial.

The Appellant, however, does not make any reference

to the trial transcript where this exclusion supposedly
happened.

In light of the cases cited above, absent a

record on this matter, the Appellate Court should decline to
even rule on this issue.
However, if the Appellate Court should look at the
supposed exclusion of the proposed Pre-Trial Settlement
Agreement, there are other factors to support its exclusion.
10

If in fact the Trial Court did exclude the proposed Pretrial Settlement Agreement as evidence to deny Appellee's
claim for attorney's fees, it was properly done.

The

submission of pre-trial negations for settlement to support
or attack a claim is improper under Rule 408 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

In that the Defendant/Appellant claimed

he was using the proposed agreement to counter Plaintiff's
claim for attorney's fees, this goes directly to the
question of liability for her claim.

Therefore, Rule 408

would specifically exclude any evidence.

The only argument

that could be made in supporting the acceptance of the
proposed Pre-trial Settlement Agreement as evidence is if it
qualified as an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It did not.

Rule 68

specifically refers to actions for money judgments only and
a divorce proceeding is an equitable proceeding, not a
proceeding for money judgment.
This Court held in Ostler v. Ostler, 131 Utah Adv.
Rpt. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) that it could be appropriate
for the Court to award attorney's fees on appeal, see
Mauohan v. Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

In

that decision, the court relies on Utah Code Ann. Section
30-3-3 (1989).

In this case, Plaintiff's original counsel

withdrew as counsel and Plaintiff was unable to proceed with
her appeal pro se. As a result, her appeal was dismissed.
Plaintiff/Appellee was only able to obtain counsel through
11

the pro bono attorney program at Utah Legal Services, Inc.
Plaintiff/Appellee is clearly impecunious and, based on the
court's language in Ostler^ an award of attorney's fees on
appeal would be appropriate.

Therefore, the

Plaintiff/Appellee respectfully requests this Court to
extend the grant of attorney's fees made by the Trial Court
to include attorney's fees on appeal.
Ill
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS PROPER IN THIS CASE BASED
ON THE NEED AND FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE AND THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S
ABILITY TO PAY.
In determining the need for alimony in a particular
case, the Trial Court must look to three basic
circumstances.

The Trial Court should look at the financial

condition and the need of the receiving spouse, the ability
of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income and the
ability of the paying spouse to pay alimony, Oscruthorpe
at 23 citing Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

In this case, the court made specific

findings as to the financial ability of the Plaintiff.

The

Court specifically found that she was unemployed at the time
of trial but she had the ability to earn $18,000.00 per
year, or $1,500.00 per month.

The Court also specifically

found that the Defendant/Appellant was currently employed
and earning in excess of $7,500.00 per month.

From these

findings, the Appellant had the ability to pay the alimony
awarded of $650.00 per month.
12

It was also determined by the

Court that the amount of income that the Plaintiff/Appellee
could earn was not sufficient.
In determining the sufficiency of the alimony, the
Trial Court needed to look at other factors.

In determining

whether or not a party has sufficient income, the Court must
look at the purpose for an award of alimony.

The Utah

courts have held that the purposes for an award of alimony
are to maintain the standard of living as close to that of
the marriage as possible, prevent the receiving spouse from
becoming a public charge and to equalize the respective
standards of living, Munns v. Munns, 131 Utah Adv. Rpt. 88
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) citing numerous cases for support.
Therefore, in determining whether Appellee had sufficient
income without an award of alimony, the Court needed to
examine the standard of living.

The Court made extensive

findings regarding the financial condition of the parties.
See Appendix C - AFOF.

From these findings, it was clear

that, absent an award of alimony, the Plaintiff was not
capable of ever reaching the point of earning a sufficient
income to attain the standard of living previously enjoyed
during the marriage.
During the marriage, the parties earned in excess of
$7,500.00 per month.

Based on the findings of the Trial

Court, the Defendant/Appellant would continue to earn that
amount.

However, the Appellee was only capable of earning

$1,500.00 per month.

This sum, added to an award of child
13

support of $1,183.00, was less than one-third of the income
enjoyed by the parties during the marriage.

Even with the

$650.00 in alimony, Appellee's income would be less than
half of the previous family income and yet she would have
two-thirds of the family living with her.

This was true

while Defendant's income would be reduced by only $1,833.00
per month.

Therefore, the amount of alimony awarded was

appropriate.
This Court has determined in numerous cases that an
award of alimony for an indeterminant period of time,
"permanent" alimony, is appropriate under certain
circumstances.

The Utah courts have determined that, based

upon a party's marketable skills, professional training and
ability to earn, if the party would not be able to enter the
job market and support himself or herself in anything even
resembling the style in which the couple had been living, an
award of "permanent" alimony is appropriate.

See Jones v.

Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d
96 (Utah 1986), Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 654 (Utah 1985) and
most recently, the Munns decision.

In this case, the Trial

Court found that Appellee was capable of earning $1,500.00
per month.

This was based upon her skills and previous

earning capacity.

This sum fits the test of her not being

able to "enter the job market and support herself in
anything even resembling the style in which the couple had
been living," Jones at 1075.
14

The Trial Court did find that Appellee was a full
time student.

It is possible that the Appellee may have an

increased income upon graduation.

Should this occur,

however, it would then be appropriate for the court to
determine if the alimony should remain in place.

The Court

should not speculate until such time as the income becomes
definite and actual.

If that should occur, the Court

retains jurisdiction and can modify the amount.

See Olsen

at 567 and Anderson at 479.
It should also be noted that the Appellant pushed to
have the Divorce Decree entered prior to the expiration of
ten (10) years.

If Appellee had been married to the

Appellant for ten (10) years, she would then be eligible for
divorce spouse benefits under the Social Security Act.
42 U.S.C. Sections 402(b)(1)(3) and 416(d)(1).

See

If the Court

had merely waited seven (7) months to enter the Decree of
Divorce, the Plaintiff would qualify for social security
benefits.

In that the Court granted Defendant's Motion to

Bifurcate and granted the Decree of Divorce prior to the ten
(10) year requirement, these benefits are lost. Therefore,
it is appropriate for the award of alimony to be permanent.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant in this case has simply failed to meet
the standard required to overturn a Trial Court's decision
in a domestic case.

The Appellate Court, in reviewing the

Trial Court's decision, must give the Trial Court wide
15

latitude and absent a showing that the Trial Court abused
its discretion and entered findings that are clearly
erroneous, the Trial Court's determinations must be upheld.
The Appellant has made no attempt to show that the Trial
Court abused its discretion and made findings that were
clearly erroneous.

The failure to designate parts of the

transcript to show that the Court relied on evidence that
was inappropriate shows that the evidence simply must not
exist.
If the Appellate Court, absent the Appellant's
showing of evidence, still reviews the Court's findings to
determine their sufficiency, it is clear that the Trial
Court entered sufficient findings for its decision.

The

Trial Court applied the proper standards in awarding both
attorney's fees and "permanent" alimony.

Therefore, the

Appellee respectfully requests that this Court uphold the
Trial Court's decision, also award the Appellee's attorney's
fees on appeal, and remand the case for further proceedings
on the amount of attorney's fees for the appeal.
Respectfully submitted this
1991.
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U

day of March,

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Mary C.
Corporon, Attorney for Appellant, CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C,
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, this

£j

day of March, 1991.

Id schascha.brf
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ADDENDA

APPENDIX A

Third juaiciai uisinci

MARY C. CORPORON
734
Attorney for Defe* *nt
CORPORON & WILLIAfc
Suite 1100 - Bostor Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City# Utai 84111
(801) 328-1162

JAN

5 1959

IM THE 1 TRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR S

T LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

JOAN E. SCHAFER,
Plaintiff,
_vs~

DECREE OF DIVORCE
'ivil No. 884902670DA

NATHAN C. SCHArER,

u

ie John A. Rokich

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having . -me on for hearing before
the above-entitled court on Thursday, uhe 5th day of January,
1989, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge presiding, plaintiff
being present in person and through her counsel, and defendant
being present in person and through his counsel of record, Mary
C. Corporon, more than 90 days having elapsed since the filing of
the Complaint in this action and the Court having previously
signed and entered an Order Granting Motion for Bifurcated Trial,
the Court proceeded to hear the sworn testimony of the parties;
based

thereon, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court

having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now, therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Flaintiff and defendant are each hereby granted a Decree

of Divorce from the other, dissolving the bonds of matrimony
heretofore existing between the parties, the same to become final
and effective immediately upon being signed by the Judge and
entered by the clerk in the register of actions.
2.

All remaining outstanding issues in this matter are

reserved for further trial in this case.
3.

Until the trial of the reserved issues in this matter,

the temporary order previously entered by this Court shall remain
in full force and effect.
DATED THIS

<^T~ day of January, 1989.
BY THE COURT

Tu
JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL OOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT. 8ALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF
DATE.
'
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OEPUTY COURT CLERK

APPENDIX B

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
JOAN E. SCHAFER,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE

-vs-

Civil No. 884S02670DA

NATHAN C. SCHAFER,

Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER havi.vg come on for trial before
the above-entitled court on the 13th, 14th and 17th days of July,
1989, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge presiding, plaintiff
being present in person and through her counsel of record, David
5, Dolowitz, and

the defendant being

present

in person and

through his counsel of record, Mary C. Ccrporon, the Court having
proceeded to hear the sworn testimony of the parties and their
witnesses, having received the exhibits of the parties and having
heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the file and
the pleadings contained therein, the Court being fully advised in
the premises and more than 90 days having elapsed since the
filing of the Complaint for Divorce in this action, and having
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, now, therefor;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent care, custody

and control of the two minor children of the parties, Zachary and
Lillian, subject to defendant's reasonable and liberal rights of
visitation.
2.

Defendant is awarded visitation with the minor children

of the parties, including a minimum of the following:
a.

Every other weekend, from Friday evening until

Sunday evening;
b.

One day in the middle of each week;

c.

Alternate state and federal holidays;

d.

An extended period of time, up to four weeks each

summer;
e.

Plaintiff

shall have the children with her on

Mother's Day and her birthday, each year, and defendant shall
have Father's Day and his birthday with the children each year,
irrespective of any other portion of this visitation schedule;
f.

Defendant

is

awarded

reasonable

and

liberal

telephone access to the minor children of the parties;
g.

Defendant shall be granted access, at all times, to

the educational and health care records of the children.
Based upon the stipulation of the parties, defendant is
hereby ordered to exercise his visitation with the minor children
of the parties.
3.

Defendant is hereby ordered to pay child support to the

plaintiff, for the support and maintenance of the minor children
of the parties in the total sura of One Thousand One Hundred
Eicjhty-Three

Dollars

($1,183.00)

per
2

month,

oc

Five

Hundred

Ninety-One

Dollars

and Fifty Cents

($591.50) per month, per

child, payable through the Clerk of this Court, until each child
has attained the age of 18 years or graduated from high school in
the normal course of their high school educations, whichever
event occurs later.

Said child support shall abate by 50% during

any period of time in which the defendant has the actual physical
care, custody and control of the minor children for 25 or more
consecutive days.
4.

If the defendant

falls thirty (30) or more days in

arrears in his child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seg. (Supp. 1988).
5.

Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain health and

accident insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children
of the parties as such is available through his employment, until
each child has attained the age of 18 years or graduated from
high school, whichever last occurs.

The parties are ordered to

share equally in payment of any non-routine medical and dental
expenses incurred for the benefit of the minor children which are
not

covered

insurance.

by

defendant's

The plaintiff

policy

of

health

and

accident

is ordered to pay and assume all

routine medical and dental expenses incurred for the benefit of
the minor children.
6.

Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain in force a

policy of
benefit

life

payable

insurance
on

death

on his own life, having a minimum
of

Three

Hundred

Thousand

Dollars

($300,000.00), naming the minor children as the sole primary
beneficiaries thereof.

Said insurance coverage shall continue in
3

effect until each child achieves the age of 18 years or graduates
from high school in the normal course of his or her education,
whichever event occurs later.

Defendant is hereby awarded the

cash surrender value of any life insurance policies he presently
owns, as his sole and separate property.
7.

Each

party

is

awarded

his

or

her

own

items

of

personal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings.
8.

The

parties' previous

division

of

their

items of

furniture, fixtures, appliances and household goods is confirmed
in each and each party is hereby awarded all such items presently
in his or her own possession.
9.
received

Plaintiff is hereby awarded all interest and monies
as

a

result

of

the

rebate

previously

received

by

plaintiff for the parties' 1988 Utah State Income Taxes in the
approximate sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), free and clear
of any interest of the defendant.
10.

Pursuant

to

the

stipulation

of

the

parties, the

plaintiff and defendant are hereby ordered to file, and cooperate
in the filing of, joint federal and state income tax returns for
the 19 88 tax year.
received
defendant

by
is

reason

The parties shall share equally in any refund
of

ordered

that

to

pay

joint
and

income
assume

tax
and

filinghold

The

plaintiff

harmless on any income tax liability incurred by reason of the
joint filing.

In the event that the University of• Utah should

seek a refund of a PEL grant and/or any financial assistance
granted to plaintiff during the 1988/1989 academic year due to
this joint filing, defendant is ordered to pay any refund to the
University of Utah so requested by the University of Utah and to
4

hold the plaintiff harmless thereon.
11.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the diamond ring valued at

Ten Thousand

Eight: Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars

($10,875.00)/

free and clear of any interest of the defendant.
12.

The

retirement

accounts

held

in the name of the

defendant and acquired through defendant's employment with the
University of Utah and the United States Government shall be
divided equally between the parties, according to the Woodward
formula,

one-half

to

each,

This

Court

should

issue

the

appropriate allocations or qualified domestic relations orders
distributing these retirement accounts accordingly.
13.

Plaintiff

is hereby

awarded the

1983 Subaru GL10

automobile and plaintiff is hereby awarded the 1985 Volkswagen
Jetta automobile, each free and clear of any interest of the
other party.
14.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the Keystone account as her

sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest of the
defendant.

Defendant is hereby awarded the Merrill Lynch account

as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest
of the plaintiff.

Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the

sum of Seven Thousand Four Hundred Forty-One Dollars ($7,441*00)
as a marital property settlement herein.
15.

Plaintiff

is hereby

awarded

all right,

title and

interest in her banking accounts with Tracy Collins Bank, free
and clear of any interest of the defendant.

Defendant is hereby

av/arded all right, title and interest in his banking accounts
with the University of Utah Credit Union, free and clear of any
interest of the plaintiff.
5

16.

Defendant is hereby ordered to pay alimony to the

plaintiff in the sum of Six Hundred Fifty Dollars ($650-00) per
month, said alimony to continue until the death of the plaintiff,
the death of the defendant or the remarriage or cohabitation of
the plaintiff, whichever first occurs.
17.

In the event that any deficiency judgment is assessed

against the parties as a result of the foreclosure on their
marital residence, the parties are ordered to share equally in
payment of the same, and each shall be ordered to hold the other
harmless on one-half of any such obligation.
ordered

to pay and

Plaintiff is hereby

assume the debts and obi igations to her

parents, the debt for her moving expenses and the debt for her
counseling costs, and is ordered to hold the defendant harmless
thereon•

E3ch party is hereby ordered to p^y and assume all

debts and obligations incurred in his or her own name since the
date of filing of the Complaint for Divorce in this action and
each is ordered to hold the other harmless thereon.
18.

Plaintiff is denied any award of equitable restitution.

19.

Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff and/or

plaintiff's counsel the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00)
representing a portion of plaintiff's court costs and attorney's
fees incurred herein.
ordered

to

pay

and

With Lhis exception, each parLy is hereby
assume

his

or

her own

court

costs and

attorney's fees incurred in this matter.
20.

Each party is hereby ordered to execute and deliver all

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein.
21.

P].:i;it iff's previous s.irnaira is h-sroLy rc-::tor^d to her
6

and she shall be known hereafter as "Joan Donato."
22.

Neither party is found to be in contempt of this Court

at this time.
DATED THIS

day of November, 1989.
BY THE COURT

JOHN A. ROKICH
Distiict Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that

I era employed

in the offices of

Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that
I caused the foregoing proposed Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to be served upon plaintiff by placing a true
and correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to:
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
and depositing the same in the United States mail at Salt Lake
City, first class postage pre-paid thereon, on the

I

^day of

October, 1989.

Secretary

J'

APPENDIX C

COPY

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
JOAN E. SCHAFER,
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Civil No, 884902670DA

NATHAN C. SCHAFER,

Judge John A. Rokich

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before
the above-entitled court on the 13th, 14th and 17th days of July,
1989, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge presiding, plaintiff
being present in person and through her counsel of record, David
S. Dolowitz, and

the defendant

being present

in person and

through his counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, the Court having
proceeded to hear the sworn testimony of the parties and their
witnesses, having received the exhibits of the parties and having
heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the file and
the pleadings contained therein, the Court being fully advised in
the premises

and more than 90 days having elapsed since the

filing of the Complaint

for Divorce in this action, and good

cause appearing therefor, the Court now makes and enters the
following:

FINDIHGS OF FACT

1.

At the time of the trial both plaintiff and defendant

were residents of Salt Lake County# State of Utah, and had been
so for a period of three months or more immediately prior to the
filing of the Complaint in this action.
2.

The parties to this action were previously husband and

wife, having been married on July 27, 1979 in Slippery Rock,
Pennsylvania and having been divorced by a Decree of Divorce
entered herein on or about January 5, 1989.

The Decree of

Divorce reserved all issues remaining as between the parties,
with the exception of the entry of the divorce itself.
3.

The parties to this action are the parents of two minor

children, namely:
born June 19, 1985.

Zachary, born April 27, 1983; and Lillian,
Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be

awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the minor
children of the parties, subject to defendant's reasonable and
liberal rights of visitation.
4.

Defendant's rights of visitation with the minor children

should include the following:
a.

Every other weekend, from Friday evening until

Sunday evening;
b.

One day in the middle of each week;

c.

Alternate state and federal holidays;

d.

An extended period of time, up to four weeks each

e.

Plaintiff should have the children with her on

suminer;

Mother's Day and her birthday, each year, and defendant should
have father's Day and his birthday wLth the children each year,
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irrespective of any other portion of this visitation schedule;
f.

Defendant

should

have

reasonable

and

liberal

telephone access to the minor children of the parties;
g.

Defendant should be granted access, at all times,

to the children's educational and health care records.
5.

Defendant should be ordered to exercise visitation with

the minor children of the parties, based upon the stipulation of
the parties to such an order.
6.

Defendant should be ordered to pay child support to the

plaintiff, for the support and maintenance of the minor children
cf the parties, pursuant to his child support guideline worksheet
submitted to the Court at the time of trial and designated as
••Defendant's Exhibit 1. " Specifically, said support should be in
the total amount of Five Hundred Ninety-One Dollars ($591.50) per
month, por child, for a total of One Thousand One JTu.»dred EightyThree Dollars ($1,183.00) per month, as and for child support,
said support to continue until such time as the minor children
achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from high school in the
normal course of their high school educations, whichever event
ocrurs later.

Said child support should be payable through the

cleric of this Court.

Further, said child support should abate by

50% during any period of time in which the defendant has the
actual physical care, custody and control of the minor children
for 25 or more consecutive days.
7.

If the defendant falls thirty (30) or more days in

arrears in his child support obligation, the plaintiff should be
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1968).
3

8.

Defendant

should be ordered to maintain health and

accident insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children
of the parties as such is available through his employment, until
each child has attained the age of 18 years or graduated from
high

school, whichever

last occurs.

The parties should be

ordered to share equally in payment of any non-routine medical
and

dental

expenses

incurred

for

the

benefit

of

the minor

children which are not covered by defendant's policy of health
and accident insurance^

Tho plaintiffflhnplrihe ordered to pay

and assume ^STt-routina medical and dental expenses incurrecT^for
the benefit of the minor children and should hold tfie~~defentiafir£
harmless thereon.
9.

Defendant should be ordered to maintain a policy of life

insuranre on his own life, having a minimum benefit payable on
death of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00), naming the
minor children as the

sole onwrfarv beneficiaries thereof, said

insurance to continue until the children achieve the age of 18
years or graduate from high school in the normal course of their
education, whichever event occurs latet^

Defendant ^j\ould be

awarded the cash surrender value of any lite insurance policies
he presently owns, as his sol-* and separate property.
10.

During the course of their marriage the parties have

acquired certain items of personal effects, jewelry, clothing and
belongings.

Each party should be awarded his or her own such

items of personalty.
11.

During the course of their marriage the parties have

acquired various items of furniture, fixtures, appliances and
household goodn, which items have boen previously divided by tho
4

parties and which division should be confirmed in each, with each
party to be awarded all such items presently in his or her own
possession.
12.

At the time of trial herein, plaintiff was not employed

outside the home and was attending school full-time as a student
at

the

University

of

Utah.

At

the

time

of

trial

herein,

plaintiff anticipated she would graduate in late 1990 or early
1991 with a Bachelor's degree*
13.

Plaintiff's expert at trial, Dr. Steve Reynolds, an

economist,

testified

that

plaintiff

is

capable

of

obtaining

employment in the State of Utah with her current job skills and
experience at an income of Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00)
per year.

Based upon this testimony, the Court attributes an

income-earning
calculating

capability

alimony,

in

to
the

the

plaintiff,

sum of

Eighteen

for

purposes

Thousand

of

Dollars

($38,000.00) per year.
11.

At the time of trial herein defendant was employed as a

medical doctor at the University of Utah and at the United States
Veterans Administration Hospital, both in Salt Lake City, Utah,
at a total gross monthly income of Seven Thousand Five Hundred
Sixty Dollars ($7,560.00) per month for both jobs.
15.

At the time of trial herein, plaintiff was 40 years of

age and defendant was 37 years of age.

Plaintiff was previously

married, prior to the time she became married to the defendant in
this

action,

and

had

one

child

by

that

marriage,

a

minor

daughter, who was 16 years of age at the time of trial herein.
At

the

time

of

the

trial

herein,

plaintiff

was

entitled

to

receive the sum of Two Hundred Forty Dollars ($.740.00) per month
5

as and for support for her daughter.

As of the time of trial

herein, plaintiff had never petitioned any court to increase the
child

support

obligation

owing

for

her

child

by

her

former

husband.
16.

At the time the parties to this action were married, in

July 1979, defendant had already graduated from medical school
and was

already

a medical

doctor,

having

completed

his M.D.

degree in May 1979.
17.

At the time of the parties' marriage the plaintiff was

employed by Huron Road Hospital, as an administrative assistant,
at an annual salary of approximately Thirteen Thousand Dollars
($13,000.00).

As of the date of the parties' marriage, plaintiff

had completed some course work toward a degree from a college or
university at several institutions, but had not obtained a degree
from a college or university.
18.
fee

At the time of the parties' marriage, plaintiff was the

title

holder

single-family
mortgage

of

certain

dwelling

obligation

real

property,

in Cleveland,

on

that

consisting

Ohio, subject

property

and

subject

of

a

to a first
to

a

lien

thereon in favor of her former husband.
19.
moved

Immediately upon the parties' marriage, the defendant

to Alrron, Ohio to complete

Hospital

from

July

1979

an internship

through

June

at Akron City

1980.

During

the

defendant's internship at Akron City Hospital, plaintiff resided
in her home in Cleveland, Ohio, until November
moved

to

terminating

Akron,
her

Ohio

to

employment

reside
with

with
the

Cleveland, Ohio.
6

the

Huron

1979, and then
defendant,

Road

thus

Hospital

in

20.

After defendant completed his internship at the Akron

City Hospital he completed his residency at the Akron Community
Hospital

in Akron, Ohio.

During the years of the parties'

marriage when defendant completed his internship and/or residency
in Akron, Ohio, the parties resided in TOcron, Ohio, Hudson, Ohio
and Stowe, Ohio, all suburbs of the Akron, Ohio area.

Each

residential move within the Akron, Ohio area, from Akron to
Hudson, and from Hudson tc Stowe, was made based upon a mutual
agreement

between

the

parties

and

because

the parties were

seeking better living accommodations within the Akron, Ohio area.
21.

Defendant became board certified in 1984.

22.

Plaintiff attended college in Ohio off and on from 1980

through 1983.
23.

Plaintiff and defendant moved from Stowe, Ohio to Salt

Lake City, Utah, in 1983 to enable defendant to accept employment
in Salt Lake City, Utah.
24.

The

parties

moved

from

Salt

Lake

City,

Utah to

Pittsburg, Pennsylvania to enable defendant to accept employment.
The parties resided in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania for approximately
one year, from 1986 to 1987.
25.

In 1987, the parties returned from Pittsburg to Salt

Lake City, Utah to enable defendant to accept employment at the
University of Utah and VA Hospital in Salt Lake City.
26.

Plaintiff consented to the moves from Ohio to Salt Lake

City, from Salt Lake City to Pittsburg, Pennsylvania and from
Pittsburg to Salt Lake City.
27.

Plaintiff continued to attend college off and on, on

both occasions vhen she resiled in Salt Lake City.
7

As of the end

of winter quarter#

1988, plaintiff had completed or had been

given transfer credits for 315 quarter hours toward her degree at
the University of Utah.
28.
care

on

The minor child of the parties, Zachary, was in day
a regular basis

from

age

six months

on, with the

exceiJtion of the period of time when the parties resided in
Pittsburg,

Pennsylvania.

The

minor

child

of

the

parties,

Lillian, was in day care on a regular basis from age one year on.
29.

During the course of their marriage the parties have

retained services of a maid or housekeeper off and on to assist
the plaintiff with housework in the parties' home.
30.

From the time defendant ceased her employment^with the

Huron Road Hospital in Cleveland, Ohio in November 1979 until the
separation of the parties in May 1988, defendant supported the
plaintiff's

minor

child

from

a previous

marriage, with the

exception of the Two Hundred Forty Dollars ($240*00) plaintiff
received for the support of said child from the child's natural
father.
31.

From the date the plaintiff terminated her employment

with the Uurc n Road Hospital in Cleveland, Ohio in November 1979,
until 1982, defendant paid the mortgage, real property taxes and
insurance on the plaintiff's residence in Cleveland, Ohio, with
the exception of a period of approximately one y^ar, during which
the parties received sporadic r*nt payments from tenants for a
portion of the expenses of that property.
32-

Tn 1932 plaintiff sold her former nurital residence in

Cleveland, Ohio.

The parties' testimony differed

as to the

amount of net proceeds received from the salt c,f that propsxty
8

after BatiBfaction of the outstanding mortgage indebtedness and
the lien obligation owing thereon to plaintiff's former husband.
Plaintiff

testified

that

she

received—net-—proceeds

of

approximately Seventeen Thousand Dollarsr^l$17,000.00) ^from the
sale of the real property and defendant testified that plaintiff,
received approximately Eleven Thousand Dollars ($11,000.00) net
proceeds from that sale.

The Court finds that the determination

of the exact amount of net proceeds received from the sale of the
Cleveland, Ohio property is not material to determination of this
case.

The net proceeds from the sale of the plaintiff's property

in Cleveland, Ohio were placed in a joint savings account in the
nain^s of both parties.
33.

In 3982, from the joint savings account of the parties,

the defendant purchaned a Porsche automobile, which was titled
solely and exclusively in the name of the defendant, and which
defendant owned and drove as his motor vehicle, for approximately
one year.

Thereafter, defendant

sold this

automobile at a

profit, and all of the proceeds of that sale, including the
profit, were placed back into the joint savings account of the
parties.
34.

Tn 1983, upon moving to Salt Lake City, Utah, the

parties purchased a residence in Salt Lake County, hereinafter
described as the "marital residence."

This propexty was acquired

by the parties for a purchase price of One Hundred Sixty-Nine
Thousand Dollars ($169,000.00).
on

this

marital

residence

The parties made a down payment
of

Seventeen

Thousand

Dollars

($17,000.00) and financed the balance, of One Hundred Fifty-Two
Thousand

Dollars

($152,000.00),

purnnant
9

to

a variable

rate

mortgage.

The title to the marital residence was held jointly in

the names of both parties.
payment

on

the

marital

The source of funds for the down

residence

was

Ten

Thousand

Dollars

($10,000.00) from defendant's bonus from Akron City Hospital and
Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) from the joint savings account
of the parties.

The last monthly payment obligation which the

parties owed to the mortgage holder on the marital residence was
in the approximately sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($1,500.00), including principal, interest, taxes and insurance.
The

parties

ceased

making

monthly

payments

on

the

marital

residence in the summer of 1988, and the property was foreclosed
upon and sold pursuant to a trustee's sale in June 1989.
the

date

of

foreclosure.

trial

herein,

the

property

had

been

As of

lost

to

As of the date when the parties ceased making the

monthly mortgage payments on the property, the property had a
-negative value- to the parti.-.s, in that the outstanding mortgage
obligation and costs of sale exceeded the fair market value of
the property by reason of declining market values in Salt Lake
County from 1983 through 1988. All.of the parties' investment in
the marital residence had been lost by reason of the declining
market value at the time of the parties' separation.
source

of

payments made on the marital

residence

The sole
from 1983

through 1988 was the income of the defendant.
35.

The parties received a tax rebate from the State of

Utah in October 1988 in the approximate sum of Five Hundred
Dollars

($500.00), representing a rebate on their Utah State

Income Taxes for 1988.
cashed it.

The plaintiff endorsed this check and

This distribution of these funds to the plaintiff
10

should be affirmed and plaintiff should be awarded the 1988 tax
rebate of the parties as her sole and separate propertyf free and
clear of any interest of the defendant.
36.

Plaintiff and defendant stipulated at the time of trial

herein that the parties should

file joint state and federal

income tax returns for the tax year 1988# with defendant to be
solely responsible for any tax liability incurred by reason of
the filing of the joint returns and with the parties to share
equally in any refunds if any are to be received.
this

stipulation,

this

Court

should

order

that

Based upon
the

parties

cooperate in the filing of joint 1988 federal and state income
tax returns.

The parties should be ordered to share equally in

any refund received by reason of that joint income tax filing.
The defendant

should

be ordered to pay and assume and hold

plaintiff harmless on any income tax liability incurred by reason
of the joint filings.
should

seek

a

refund

In the event that the University of Utah
of

a

PEL

grant

and/or

any

financial

assistance granted to plaintiff dvring the 1988/1989 academic
year by reason of plaintiff's separation frcm defendant and by
reason of this filing of a joint tax return

for 1988, then

defendant should be ordered to make any refund to the University
of Utah so requested by the University of Utah and should be
ordered to hold the plaintiff harmless thereon.
37.

During

the

course

of

the

parties' marriage

the

plaintiff has acquired an interest in a diamond ring which the
plaintiff

insured

at

a value of Ten Thousand

Seventy-Five Dollars ($10,875.00).

Eight

Hundred

The Court places the value of

thij ring at Ten Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-rive Dollars
11

($10#875.00).

The diamond ring should be awarded to plaintifff

free and clear of any interest of the defendant.
38.

During

the

course

of

the

parties' marriage

the

defendant has acquired an interest in certain retirement accounts
through the University of Utah in the TIAA/CREF retirement plan
and through the United States Government through his employment
with the United States Veteran Administration Hospital.

Both

these retirement accounts should be divided equally between the
parties# according to the Woodward formula, one-half to each, and
the appropriate allocations orders should issue from this Court
distributing these retirement accounts accordingly.
39.

During

the course

of their marriage, the parties

acquired an interest in certain motor vehicles, including a 1983
Subaru GL10 and a 1985 Volkswagen Jetta.

The Subaru should be

awarded to the plaintiff, free and clear of any interest of the
defendant.

The Jetta should be awarded to the defendant, free

and clear of any
vehicle

interest of the plaintiff.

is encumbered

by any obligation.

Neither rooter

The motor vehicle

awarded to the plaintiff has an approximate fair market value of
One Thousand

Five Hundred

Dollars

($1#500.00)

and

the motor

vehicle awarded to the defendant has an approximate fair market
value of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00).
40.

During

the

course

of

their marriage

the

parties

acquired an interest in various savings and investment accounts,
including accounts at Merrill Lynch and Keystone.

The Court

finds that at the time of filing of the Complaint for Divorce
horein, the Morrill Lynch account had a value of Thirty-One
Thousand

One Hundred

Ninety-Three
12

Dollars

($31,193.00), less

withdrawals

of

Two Thousand

Two Hundred

Fifty-Three

Dollars

($2,253.00) and Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) to pay debts
and attorney's fees.

At the time of the filing of the Complaint

for Divorce herein the Keystone account liad a value of Nine
Thousand Three Hundred Eighteen Dollars ($9,318.00).

Each party

should receive Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Nine Dollars
(^17,629.00) as his or her share of the Merrill Lynch and
Keystone accounts.

The plaintiff should receive the Keystone

account as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any
interest of the defendant, and the defendant should be ordered to
pay

to plaintiff

an additional

Seven

Thousand

Eight Hundred

Seventy-Six Dollars ($7,876.00) as a maiital property settlement
herein, less a credit to deferiant of Four Hundred Thirty-Five
Dollars ($435.00) representing payments maJe by defendant for the
plaintiff's car repairs and Visa account during the parties'
separation.

Defendant should be awarded all right, title and

interest in the Merrill Lynch account of the parties, free and
clear of any interest of the plaintiff.
41.

Plaintiff

should be awarded

all right, title and

interest in her banking accounts with Tracy Collins Bank, free
and clear of any interest of the defendant.

Defendant should be

awaried all right, title and interest in his banking accounts
with the University of Utah Credit Unirn, free and clear of any
interest of the plaintiff.
42.

Defnndant should be ordered to pay alimony to the

plaintiff in the sum of Six Hundred Fifty Dollars ($650.00) per
month, said alimony to continue until the death of the plaintiff,
the doath of the defendant or the rcuairiago or cob&bitaiion of
13

the plaintiff# whichever first occurs.
43.

During the course of their marriage the parties have

incurred various debts and obligations, including the possibility
of a deficiency judgment to be assessed against the parties by
reason of the foreclosure on the marital residence, an obligation
owing

by

the

plaintiff

to

her

parents#

plaintiff's

moving

expenses by reason of her move from the marital residence of the
parties upon its foreclosure, and plaintiff's counseling costs.
The parties should be ordered to share equally in any deficiency
assessed against them by reason of the foreclosure of the marital
residence, and each should Le ordered to hold the other harmless
on one-half of any such obligation.

Plaintiff should be ordered

to pay and assume the debts and obligations to her parents, for
her moving expenses and for her counseling costs, and should be
ordered

to hold the defendant liarmless thereon.

Each party

should be ordered to pay and assume all d-.*bts and obligations
incurred in his or her own name, commencing with the date of
filing of the Complaint

for Divorce in this action and each

should be ordered to hold the other harmless thereon.
44.
equitable

In

addressing

restitution

against

considered the following:
approximately nine

the

issue of plaintiff's
the

defendant,

that

(9) years; and th* financial

at

the

for

Court

has

the length of the marriage, which was

which the plaintiff maae to the marriage.
established

the

claim

time

the

contribution

The evidence at trial

parties

were

married

the

defendant had completed medical school and /tfJfe completing his
internship training.

The plaintiff only worked

perioi of time during the parties' niarriaoo.
14

for a short

During the parties'

marriage

the

plaintiff

college education

had

the

and to enjoy other

experiences as she saw fit.
sacrifices

or

opportunity

contribution

to

continue her

social and educational

The plaintiff did not make any
for

any

substantial

period which

increased the earning capacity of the defendant.

However, the

Court has taken into account the fact that, as a mother, the
plaintiff

did

contribute

to

the

family

relationship

of the

parties.

Plaintiff did not suffer from a disparity in earning

capacity as a result of the marriage; in fact, she had the
opportunity to enhance her earning capacity by education during
the marriage.

Defendant provided the funds to pay for day care

and babysitters and for household assistance so that plaintiff
could take advantage of furthering her career goals.

The assets

of the marital estate were acquired primarily from defendant's
income.

The assets consisted, at the time of trial, of two motor

vehicles,

personal

effects, minimal

furniture

and

cash

and

securities having a value of Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty-Eight

Dollars

accumulated

solely

($34,258.00).
by

defendant's

This

marital

earnings,

estate

which

was

averaged

approximately Ninety Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Four Dollars
($93,364.00) per year for the four years immediately prior to the
trial .

Thi s case

restitution.

is not an appropriate case

for equitable

At the time of the marriage the defendant was well

on his way to earning substantial sums of money.

Defendant's

earning capacity has not been attained by significant efforts and
sacrificos on the part of the plaintiff which were detrimental to
her development.

The Court should not make an award of equitable

restitution herein.
15

45.

Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees herein in the

approximate sum of Twenty-Nine Thousand Dollars

($29,000.00),

which is indicative of the fact that the demands made upon her
counsel

were

attorney's

not

fees

necessary.
of

The

approximately

defendant
Twelve

has

Thousand

incurred
Dollars

($12#000.00) herein, both to his present counsel and to a former
counsel of record.

The Court finds that the hourly rates charged

by counsel were reasonable and that each counsel did a very
respectable job in representing his or her client's case.

The

fees incurred herein were much higher than those usually charged
in a case of this type.

This was not a complex case, but for the

animosity of the parties.

This case did not present new and

novel issues that have not already been addressed by the courts.
In view of the circumstances of this case, it is reasonable, just
and

proper

that

defendant

be

ordered

to

pay

a portion of

plaintiff's court costs and attorney's fees incurred herein, in
the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00).

With the exception

of this award of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), each party
should be ordered to pay and assume his or her own court costs
and attorney's fees incurred herein.
46.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein.
47.

Prior to the parties' marriage, plaintiff was known by

the surname "Donato," which name should be restored to plaintiff
and she should be known hereafter as "Joan Donato."
48.

Each party has made various claims of contempt on the

p.irt of the other party.

The Court does not find either party to
16

be in contempt of court at this time,
FROM THE FOREGOING Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this

action and over the subject matter of this action,
2.

An Amended Decree of Divorce should enter from this

Court in conformity with the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED THIS

day of November, 1989.
BY THE COURT

JOHN A. ROKTCH
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY

CERTIFY that

I am employed

in the offices of

Ccrpcron & Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that
I caused the foregoing proposed Amended Findings of Fact and
Ccnclusicns of Law to be served upon plaintiff by placing a true
and correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to:
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
and depositing the same in the United States mail at Salt Lake
City, first class postage pre-paid thereon, on the / ' ' day of
October, 1989.

id
Secretary

APPENDIX D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOAN E. SCHAFER,

CIVIL NO. D-88-2670

Plaintiff,
vs.
NATHAN C. SCHAFER,
Defendant.

This case was tried on July 13 and 14, 1989.
was

represented

by

David

S.

Dolowitz.

represented by Mary C. Corporon.
of

the

witnesses,

being

plaintiff

defendant

The Court heard the

was

testimony

received exhibits into evidence, and at the

conclusion of the trial heard oral arguments
Court

The

The

fully

advised

in

the

of

counsel.

premises,

The

now enters its

Memorandum Decision.
The

parties

stipulated

the division of certain
remainder
child
debts;

of

support;
the

the

assets

issues

alimony;

division

as to the custody of the children,

of

to

of
be

equitable
the

the

marital

resolved

The

by the Court were:

restitution;

various

estate.

savings,

payment

of

checking, and

investment accounts; and the disposition of a diamond ring.

SCHAFER V. SCHAFER

The

Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE TWO

advised

counsel

that

the

child support award

would be in accordance with the child support guidelines.
counsel

submitted

a

there was a difference
plaintiff's

Child
of

$30.00

Obligation Worksheet, but

between

the

total

computations and those of the defendant.

accepted the

defendant's

account

cost

the

awards to

Support

of

plaintiff

computations

because

it

per

month

per

of

child

the

The Court
took

medical and'dental insurance.
$591.50

Each

into

The Court
as

child

support.
The Court awards to plaintiff and defendant one-half of
Merrill

Lynch

and

Keystone

accounts

which

the

were computed as

follows:
Merrill Lynch Account

$24,940.00

Keystone Account

$ 9,318.00
TOTAL

$34,258.00

At the time of the filing of the divorce, the Merrill
account

was

valued

at

Lynch

$31,193.00, less withdrawals of $2,253

and $3,000 to pay debts and attorney's fees.
Each

party

two accounts.
of

$9,318,

was to receive $17,629.00 as their share of the
The plaintiff is to retain the

and

the

additional $7,876.

defendant

Keystone

account

is ordered to pay plaintiff an

The defendant received

credit

for

paid to plaintiff for car repairs and a visa account.

$435.00

SCHAFER V. SCHAFER

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Court awards the plaintiff the diamond
$10,000.00,

alimony

ring

valued

at

in the sum of $650.00 per month, her costs

and attorney's fees in the sum of $io,000.00.
The

plaintiff

is

ordered to pay the debt due her parents,

her moving, and counseling costs.
Defendant

is

ordered

to maintain a minimum of $300,000.00

life insurance on his life, with his children as
and

plaintiff

as

trustee

for

the

beneficiaries,

children.

awarded the cash surrender value of any

Defendant

is

policies

he

insurance

presently owns.
The Court addressed the issue of equitable
considered

the following:

restitution

the length of the marriage which was

approximately nine years; the financial contribution
plaintiff
at

the

made
time

to the marriage.
the

parties
school

and

were
and

which

the

The evidence established that
married

was

the

completing

defendant

completed

medical

his

training.

The plaintiff only worked for a short period of

had

residency
time

during their marriage.
During the marriage the plaintiff
continue

her

college

education

had

the

opportunity

to

and to enjoy other social and

educational experiences as she saw fit to do.

SCHAFER V. SCHAFER

The

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE FOUR

plaintiff

did not make any sacrifices or contributions

for any substantial period that increased the
of

the

defendant.

However,

the

Court

earning

capacity

recognizes that as a

mother, the plaintiff did contribute to the family relationship.
Plaintiff

did

not

suffer

from

a

capacity as a result of the

marriage;

opportunity

her

provided

the

to

enhance

funds

for

day

disparity

in

earning
care

fact,

in
she

capacity.

and

earning
had

the

Defendant

babysitters

so

that

plaintiff could take advantage of furthering her career goals.
The assets of the marital estate were
from

defendant's income.

acquired,

primarily,

The assets consisted of two vehicles,

personal effects, minimal furniture , cash and securities
$34,258.00.

The

marital

defendant's earnings which

estate
averaged

was

worth

accumulated

$90,364.00

for

with

the

past

four years.
This case is not a true equitable restitution case.
time

of

earning
capacity

the

marriage

substantial

the

sums

defendant

of

was

money.

At

the

well on his way to

Defendant's

earning

was not attained by significant efforts and sacrifices

on the part of the
development.

plaintiff

which

were

detrimental

to

her

SCHAFER V. SCHAFER

PAGE FIVE
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The Court in making its award of attorney fees to
took

into

consideration

litigation.
of

the

difficulty and complexity of the

This was not a complex case, but for the

the parties.

plaintiff

animosity

This case did not present new and novel issues

that have not already been addressed by the courts.
The

litigants

made

demands upon their attorneys' time and

should be required to pay for that
not

mean

defendant

time.

However,

that

does

should pay for all the time that plaintiff

demanded of her counsel.
The

Court

found

the

hourly rates charged by both counsel

were reasonable, that both counsel did a
in

very

respectable

job

presenting their clients' case. The fees incurred were much

higher than those usually charged in a case of this type.
The

Court

concluded that a substantial portion of the fees

incurred by the plaintiff were unnecessary.
incurred

fees

The

defendant

had

of approximately $12,000, and the plaintiff fees

of approximately $29,000. which is indicative of the

fact

that

the demands made upon her counsel were not necessary.
In view of the circumstances of this case, a fee of
would

be

$10,000

reasonable to order the defendant to pay in behalf of

the plaintiff.

SCHAFER V. SCHAFER

Counsel

for

PAGE SIX

plaintiff

shall

MEMORANDUM DECISION

prepare the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of

Divorce

in

accordance

with this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this r$/

dav of July, 1989.

^ - y —

A.

A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

SCHAFER V. SCHAFER
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I
of

the

this 2/

hereby
foregoing

certify

that I mailed a true and correct copy

Memorandum

Decision,

to

the

day of July, 1989:

David S. Dolowitz
Attorney for Plaintiff
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Mary C. Corporon
Attorney for Defendant
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

"—-ry^L^^

following,

